Introduction
It is now over fifty years since Peter Watkins' famous nuclear film, The War Game, was banned from TV amidst a veritable firestorm of controversy. The furore around its censorship helped elevate it into one of the iconic films of the 1960s, particularly when, after being granted a limited cinema release in 1966, the film went on to win an Oscar in Hollywood for 'Best Documentary Feature'. 1 This was much to the chagrin of the BBC which had commissioned and produced it but in November 1965 announced it had taken the decision not to show it on TV, ostensibly on the grounds that Watkins' carefully researched documentary dramatisation of what might happen if a nuclear attack occurred on British soil was too 'horrifying for the medium of broadcasting'. At the time of its announcement, the BBC went out of its way to stress this was a decision it had taken on its own and 'not as a result of outside pressure of any kind'. 2 But when it emerged that prior to announcing the ban, the Corporation had invited officials from the Cabinet Office, Ministries of Defence and Home Office to preview it to gauge their opinion on whether or not it should be shown to the public, The War Game became a cause célèbre. Watkins had resigned from the BBC protesting the BBC's traditional independence from Government had been violated. 3 Questions were asked in the House of Commons while organisations like CND began to use the film as a campaigning tool, arguing the film exposed the terrible truth about the possession and use of nuclear weapons which the powers that be wished to keep from the TV-watching masses.
The dramatic 'fall-out' from the censorship of The War Game has continued to reverberate down the years. Watkins' career never recovered from the furore and in 1968, he quit the UK for permanent self-exile abroad, claiming the atmosphere in Britain had become inimical to his work simply because he had made The War Game and fought so hard for it to be shown to a mass TV audience. Despite a distribution deal having been struck between the BBC and the British Film
Institute in 1966 to handle a limited cinema release and all requests for private screenings, it was not until July 1985 that the BBC, as the film's legal owner, lifted its worldwide ban on TV showings, first screening The War Game as part of a BBC-2 season of programmes marking the fortieth anniversary of the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. By then, The War
Game had become a totemic film for the Left. The ending of détente and ramping up of the Cold
War during the first years of Ronald Reagan's presidency had made nuclear weapons a key public issue again in the early 1980s and throughout this period, the film continued to do a brisk trade in rentals by CND and others for screenings in public halls, schools and other gatherings.
In 1980, The War Game controversy itself was revisited when Michael Tracey in an article for The
Guardian newspaper argued that BBC papers he had seen whilst researching the authorised biography of Sir Hugh Greene seemed to point to Lord Normanbrook, the Chairman of the BBC's Board of Governors, as having played the key role in the banning of the film. 4 Normanbrook was a former Cabinet Secretary who in the 1950s and early 1960s had been at the heart of secret Government planning for Britain in the event of nuclear war, extrapolating post-attack scenarios of a kind very similar to those envisaged and critiqued by Watkins in The War Game. Greene was the BBC's Director-General of the 1960s with a famous reputation for liberalism. The actions of Greene in banning the film seemed out of character for Tracey, therefore suggesting Normanbrook as the prime mover. In a follow-up letter to The Guardian, Greene, however, denied this and right up until his death in 1987 stuck to the official BBC line that the decision not to show the film was his alone as Editor-in-Chief of the Corporation's output.
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Notwithstanding Greene's denial, suspicion has continued to dog the film up to this present day.
Who exactly banned The War Game from TV ? Was it the BBC's decision alone or was the British Government deeply implicated and the BBC's traditional independence from Government violated in 1965, as Watkins always claimed ? The controversy rumbles on. In 2015, to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the film, BBC Radio 4 broadcast The War Game Files -an independently produced radio documentary, narrated by the film director Michael Apted, which took a fresh look at the fifty year controversy. 6 Utilising new research by me into previously classified Cabinet Office files, it argued that the role of HM Government in censoring the film was more extensive than had been admitted at the time and that the official reason given for banning the film from TV -'too horrifying for the medium of broadcasting' -belied far more profound concerns which went to the very heart of the British nuclear state during the Cold War era.
This present article builds upon my recent research for the radio documentary, drawing upon the Cabinet Office files that formed the basis of the programme and disseminating these findings in more detail within an academic journal context. Reviewing the extant evidence surrounding the controversy, its aim is to take a fresh look at the old question of 'who banned The War Game?'
In writing about the film, one inevitably enters into dialogue with the work of previous scholars. In recent years, Murphy (2003) , Chapman (2006) and Shaw (2006) (Tracey, 1982: 52) . should it later be shown abroad, upon the image of the British public throughout the world.
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As Mitchell noted in his memo to Government colleagues, Mrs Whitehouse's letter raised 'some awkward points affecting relations between Government and the broadcasting authorities and has some major political overtones'. Of most concern was that Mrs Whitehouse had sent similar letters to the leaders of the Conservative Opposition and Liberal Party alongside other politicians and that The War Game had already come to the attention of the press. In Mitchell's words, this meant the matter needed 'to be gripped pretty fast and at a high level '. 11 Image, even in this era before our own one of political 'spin', was clearly everything and this was potentially embarrassing for Government because that very day, the BBC's Chairman, Lord
Normanbrook -unaware at that point of Whitehouse's letter to the Prime Minister or indeed any reference to the film in that week's press -had taken the crucial step of alerting Whitehall Here, then, we have an acknowledgement in writing by the Chairman of the BBC Board of Governors that the film was referred to Government for 'approval' (in a highly unusual move seemingly at odds with the BBC's traditional independence from Government) not because it was judged too 'horrifying for the medium of broadcasting' as expressed in the BBC's later announcement to the public, but for reasons of 'defence policy'. In memos both within the BBC and in Whitehall, the euphemism frequently used for this is 'public policy', as above.
Embarrassingly for both BBC and Government, Mrs Whitehouse, in her ill-timed letter, had already explicitly voiced the reason why the film might be thought to be a defence policy issue: namely the fear that its televising could have 'a terrible effect on the public morale'; Watkins' harrowing portrayal of the devastation of nuclear attack on the UK might cause considerable distress and a defeatist attitude amongst the mass TV-watching public which in turn could give a potential tactical advantage to the Soviets in the Cold War. 16 In this, Trevelyan reported a luncheon Bowden had had that day at which both Greene and Normanbrook were present. Bowden had taken the opportunity to raise the matter of The War Game with both men.
Trevelyan's report of the conversation indicated that Normanbrook was 'fully apprised of the embarrassment which could be caused if it were made to appear that the Government are implicated in the decision whether or not the film should be shown'. Yet, as reported by Trevelyan, the conversation went further:
If, as Lord Normanbrook and Sir Hugh Greene undoubtedly assume, the conclusion were to be reached that the film should not be shown, Sir Hugh Greene said that he would be prepared to issue a press statement to the effect that the BBC itself had decided that it would be against the public interest for the film to be shown.
If this were to be the outcome, Trevelyan noted, 'it would undoubtedly go some way towards preventing embarrassment which would be caused if the Government were known to be implicated in the decision'. Trevelyan also contemplated the alternative, though significantly he put this only in parentheses: '(If officials and the BBC reach a contrary conclusion -that the film should be shown -then it will be for Ministers to consider the matter and the possibility may arise of the Government intervening in some way)'. Pointedly, however, he ended: '(But there is no need to consider this possibility, with its serious political implications, at the moment)'.
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Hence here we have the Director-General of the BBC secretly agreeing with a senior member of the Government to put out a press statement giving the false impression the BBC had acted independently should, as both he and Normanbrook actively assumed, Whitehall officials advise against showing the film. And on 26 November 1965, this was exactly what the BBC did, releasing a statement to the press that the decision not to televise The War Game was 'the BBC's own decision… taken after a good deal of thought and discussion, but not as a result of outside pressure of any kind'.
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How could a Director-General like Sir Hugh Greene, one with such an apparently liberal reputation, allow the traditional independence of the BBC to be so heavily compromised in this way ? To understand this, one has to consider, briefly, the backgrounds of the men at the very top of the BBC to whom the decision whether or not to screen The War Game had been referred internally.
The limits of liberalism
It is important to remember this was only twenty years after the end of the Second World War when the BBC had taken explicit direction from the Ministry of Information and operated as a (Miall, 1994: 91) .
That this should be so through the 1950s and early 1960s becomes less surprising when considered against the historical backdrop. With the Cold War at its 'hottest' during these years, the wartime mentality of broadcasting as a 'fourth arm' requiring close, trusted liaisons with
Whitehall not only persisted but arguably flourished in this period. Broadcasting had been recognised as a potent means of delivering anti-communist propaganda abroad (Nelson 1997; Webb 2014) and it is noteworthy that both of the Director-Generals who served during this period had had strong track records of leadership in overseas broadcasting. (Tracey, 1983: 118; 126 (Greene, 1950: 12) . For those broadcasts aimed at the Soviet Union itself, one of the principal aims was to provide 'accounts of what liberty really means and of the fundamental qualities of the Western way of life' (Greene, 1950: 13) .
Given such a Cold War and anti-communist broadcasting background, Greene would have been sensitive to any BBC project potentially undermining of the West's ongoing struggle against the Soviet Union and from the very outset of The War Game's production, the Director-General had worried Watkins might inadvertently disclose 'classified information' (Shaw, 2006 (Shaw, : 1359 . There is little hard evidence that throughout the whole process of considering whether The War Game should be shown on television, Greene was in any way out of step with his Chair, Lord
Normanbrook. Both appeared to act together and in concert every step of the way. He drove through the plans for pre-and post-attack…. (Hennessy, 2010: 154) This was now the very same man confronted with helping to decide the fate of a film that deliberately set out to reveal on national television to a mass audience many of the harrowing facts of life in a post-nuclear attack Britain which he personally had briefed Ministers about in top secret only a few years before.
As the Cabinet Office papers reveal, when Normanbrook and Greene agreed the decision to refer the film to Whitehall, they 'undoubtedly' assumed the conclusion reached by officials and Government Ministers would be 'that the film should not be shown'. 22 They were testing the water with the current regime as to whether such a film could be shown to the public but were actively assuming the answer that would come back would be 'no'.
The Wilson Game
The subsequent course of events shows the pattern playing itself out in Whitehall largely as Normanbrook and Greene had expected, except the intervention of one highly prominent voice along the way meant the senior civil servants had to adjust the approach they took to dealing with this issue. The Cabinet Office files indicate that following its screening for officials at BBC Television Centre on Friday September 24, those officials met the next Monday, September 27, to discuss the film. The Cabinet Secretary, Sir Burke Trend, then prepared a draft submission which he circulated for comment round his colleagues from the various Ministries who had attended the screening with him. 23 Marked 'SECRET', this is a revealing memo since it records officials' first reactions after seeing the film prior to any formal revision of opinion for Ministers. Quite clearly, it shows the primary objective for the civil servants was to try to come up with the most convincing reason for the film to be suppressed.
Thus Trend began:
1. Do we agree that by comparison with a good many other films of violence which are shown on television this is not a "horror" film to which we could take exception on grounds of public decency, etc. ?
2. If so, there seem to be only two broad grounds on which we could object -ie. a) that the film is inaccurate and misleading; or, b) that it would be politically inexpedient to show it publicly.
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Point 1) is highly significant in light of the BBC's subsequent announcement to the press that the reason the film could not be shown on television was because it was too 'horrifying'. This, however, was not the initial reaction of the 'special people' the BBC had invited to see it and therefore not why, in their opinion, the film could not be broadcast.
Instead, the rest of Trend's draft concentrated on exploring whether there were any grounds under point 2) that could be used. Significantly, there was nothing in Trend's memo that stated there was anything 'inaccurate' in Watkins' depiction of a nuclear attack. As Matthew Grant has noted in his study of UK civil defence preparations during the Cold War: 'Had a nuclear war broken out on the scale depicted in the film, the British civil defence planners could only have hoped that their policies worked as well in reality as they did in The War Game' because 'the reality… would have been undoubtedly worse than that portrayed by Watkins ' (2010: 187) . Instead Trend focused on aspects that could be argued to be 'misleading' or 'unfair' in the film such as the buildup to the attack in which, in response to a growing international crisis, US President Lyndon
Johnson orders nuclear retaliation. This, it was felt, ignored 'the politico/military effort' which would 'undoubtedly be made by the great Powers to prevent the type of escalation which the film portrays'. Also, notwithstanding the later historical conclusions of Grant, the film was '"unfair"', Trend wrote, in 'writing down so heavily the effectiveness of civil defence precautions and the ability of the population to cope with devastation on a tremendous scale'.
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Trend then went on to reflect that even if the film were altered to meet such criticisms, might it still be possible for officials to advise their Ministers not to consent to its public showing on the grounds it would be politically inexpedient ? This, however, was a tricky area:
If so, we should have to base ourselves on the even more arguable ground that the film would be liable to cause unnecessary and undesirable alarm and despondency and to touch off a renewed public argument on the issues of the independent nuclear deterrent, the CND campaign etc., which the Government would find inopportune at this (? [sic.] or any other) point of time. This could be a difficult and embarrassing argument to sustain…
Trend ended his draft with the conclusion that 'the right balance between these conflicting considerations is very much a matter of political judgment -i.e. it is for Ministers to strike'. And he added:
It is complicated at this juncture by the fact that the Government are engaged in a review of civil defence policy, the results of which will have to be announced fairly soon -and may be difficult enough to sell to public opinion (including our NATO allies) without further complications of the type which the film might create. The War Game's portrayal of how inadequate existing UK civil defence preparation would be in the face of thermonuclear war was in fact a reality the Government was facing up to and acknowledging internally at that very moment. Yet in a supreme irony, if such a film were to be shown on television in late 1965, it might potentially have made it more difficult, not less, for the Government to push through the cuts to civil defence it felt were needed, despite it being in effective tacit agreement with Watkins that nuclear war was essentially unsurvivable. Rather than cries of ban the Bomb, there might have been howls the film had exposed existing preparations as so woeful the civil defence budget had to be increased massively to protect the public -not what the Labour Government wanted, or needed, at this time, as Trend recognised. namely, that there were other more subtle ways than the brute force of externally imposed censorship upon the BBC.
Cunningham outlined for Trend Soskice's suggestion that 'a small group of Ministers should see the film -as unobtrusively as possible'. It might well then be possible 'to say to the BBC that the film is open to criticism on the grounds that the introduction is politically improbable and the presentation of the results of a nuclear exchange extremely partial and one-sided'. Ministers might go on to make it clear 'that the decision whether or not the film should be shown must be taken by the BBC itself and that the Corporation must accept full responsibility for it '. 32 Here is what one might call 'The Wilson Game' -a more sophisticated and subtle approach than a direct Government ban imposed by Ministers and entirely characteristic of a Prime Minister famous for his political guile. Normanbrook -the ex-Whitehall mandarin, ever mindful of his responsibilities to 'public policy' 33 -had brought an issue of potential embarrassment and political difficulty to the Government should the latter be seen to be involved. The Government realised, however, that it need not be explicitly involved for it still to have powerful influence and effect over the final decision. Views could be communicated that the film was 'unbalanced' in certain aspects and the BBC then told it was its decision whether or not to show the film but that it must take 'full responsibility' for any consequences. Thus Trend began the meeting by stating that although it was known to certain members of BBC staff a small group of civil servants had seen the film: 'Her Majesty's Government had decided that they did not wish, as a Government, to offer any view to the BBC' on whether the film should be shown to the public. Trend went on to make clear that Ministers themselves had not seen the film. He then outlined for Normanbrook that the film had two main defects. These were, of course, 'views' but ones now being attributed to senior civil servants, not the Government. They were the ones which Trend had already highlighted in earlier memos to fellow civil servants and Ministers -namely, the presentation of the build-up to nuclear war which 'omitted the whole range of Government action that would be taken to avert such a tragedy' and the fact the American President was not shown 'in a very creditable role'. The second main defect, Trend outlined, was that 'the film depicted our civil defence forces in complete disarray as a result of a nuclear explosion'. Following Wilson's advice, Trend ended that the BBC might therefore wish to consider, if they decided to show the film to the public, 'whether to amend the film in any way or else to show it in the context of a responsible, preferably a-political [sic.] discussion'. 36 For his part, Lord Normanbrook responded that 'if a decision were taken by the BBC to show the film', most of 'the responsible opinion in the BBC would be in favour of showing it in a context of a reasoned discussion'. 37 By 'responsible opinion', Normanbrook was most likely reflecting the views of senior BBC management such as Director of Television Kenneth Adam and Controller of Programmes Huw Wheldon who had argued for the programme to be made in the first place, despite the earlier expressed doubts of both himself and Greene. 38 Normanbrook, however, stated to the meeting that his own 'personal view was that it was a film that should not be shown'
although he did acknowledge that the 'producer of the film' could argue that 'the general public ought to have brought home to them an imaginative picture of the effect of a nuclear explosion'.
Finally, Normanbrook noted 'the producer', Watkins, was on the point of leaving the BBC and the fact that the film had been made was 'now public knowledge'.
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After discussion, it was agreed Lord Normanbrook would take 'further soundings' within the BBC and inform the Cabinet Secretary 'of the terms in which the BBC would announce their decision about whether or not to show The War Game'. Normanbrook stated it was possible that the BBC would say 'that they had taken their decision after consultation with the Government'. In the meantime, if there were Parliamentary Questions (which clearly both sides were anticipating now that the film was public knowledge), 'the Government might say that, while Ministers had not seen the film, officials had and that while the Government had offered no advice to, or exerted pressure on the BBC, they had caused their views on the presentation of the film to be conveyed to the BBC'.
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Here is confirmation that Normanbrook personally did not want the film to be shown, notwithstanding the views of other 'responsible opinion' within the BBC. Also there is an indication the BBC might say it had taken its decision 'in consultation with the Government'; an interpretation which the civil servants qualify for their part as being the views of officials 'on the presentation of the film'. This recorded difference may possibly betray an initial irritation on Normanbrook's part that a decision he had expected the Government to take had been thrown back by the Wilson Government onto the BBC. Normanbrook and Greene may have hoped by referring it to Government that ultimate responsibility for the decision over whether or not to
show The War Game might have been taken from them, but now here it was being bounced back by the Wilson Government on to the BBC and Normanbrook and Greene's shoulders. Yet as
Normanbrook pointedly recorded in his own personal account of this meeting for Greene:
'Whitehall will be relieved if the BBC decides not to show it'. 41 Not only was this a form of pressure on Greene to (continue to) side with Normanbrook's personal view that the film should not be shown, it also probably was a quite accurate reflection of the sense the Chairman had taken away from talking to his former colleagues in Whitehall: to mandarins like Trend who, more than any mere politicians of the day, were the long-term guardians of the British Cold War state and who, as the record shows, had originally assumed the political decision over whether to ban
The War Game was one Ministers would take directly themselves.
Between 5 November and the BBC's press announcement of the TV ban on 26 November, we enter the period of silence in terms of the written record which Tracey and other scholars have noted with frustration (Tracey, 1982: 52; Shaw, 2006 Shaw, : 1371 . There is no surviving, or at least extant, written record within the BBC archive as to who banned The War Game; no 'killer memo' from Greene or Normanbrook explicitly authorising the ban. Instead, there is just a short press release at the end of the month that the BBC had decided not to show the film 'after a good deal of thought and discussion, but not as a result of outside pressure of any kind'. 42 Consulting the Cabinet Office record provides, however, a fresh trail of evidence, new clues and a new theory.
The three week gap before the release of a final decision may be explained partly by information which emerged shortly after the 5 November meeting broke up. That afternoon it became known that The War Game was likely to be the subject of an article in The Sunday Times later that month 'inspired by Peter Watkins'. 43 Watkins, resigned now from the BBC and fearing his film was being indefinitely shelved with no decision on it needing to be communicated to him by the BBC, had taken his case to the newspapers, revealing that 'non-BBC personnel' from the 'Home Office' (he did not know exactly who at that stage) had viewed the film on 24 September. 44 This prompted close collaboration between the BBC and Whitehall to agree a common line to answer press queries with a view to minimising any damage. 45 The Sunday Times article, 'Whitehall disliked a nuclear film', duly appeared on 14 November and thus it may well have made sense for the BBC to wait in order to deal with anything that Watkins might say to the press and also until the timing for its own announcement was better. In the wake of the article, the BBC announced it would decide 'within the next fortnight' whether or not to
show The War Game. 46 At that point, mid-November, Greene was away at a European Broadcasting Union conference in Germany (Tracey, 1982: 53) but on his return, told a meeting of the BBC's Board of Management on Monday 22 November that a decision was 'imminent' and that Kenneth Adam had already drafted a statement for the Chairman (Tracey, 1982: 52) . On 24
November, Normanbrook wrote to Trend informing him that the BBC would not be showing The War Game and enclosing a copy of the press statement, which was duly released to the public on Friday 26 November.
The Sunday Times article and the timing of Greene's German trip may have delayed the release of the press statement but the reason there is no actual extant written record within the BBC authorising the banning may simply be, from the evidence, because there was no need for any further formal meetings or correspondence between Normanbrook and Greene on this, following Normanbrook's report to Greene of his Cabinet Office meeting of 5 November. Both
Normanbrook and Greene, in a sense, had already pre-agreed the non-showing of The War Game as a fait accompli when they had referred the film to Government. They had assumed the Government would say it could not be shown on TV and that the BBC would then put out a press statement, as it had offered, saying this was a decision it had taken on its own. The only complication to the predicted pattern was when Wilson refused to allow the Government to be explicitly linked to the censorship, instead pressuring the BBC to take the decision on its own with what both have in common is an 'intervention by the core of the state in the day-to-day affairs of the BBC, which is denied by official myth' (Goodwin, 2005: 117) .
Fifty years on, we need to be clearer-eyed about some of these official myths, peering behind them to uncover the more complex historical realities out of which they were formed as much, perhaps, to obscure as to enlighten. We need to reassess the wholesale acceptance of the myth of Hugh Greene, which was partly cultivated by himself during and after he left office, as the great liberalising Director-General; instead seeing a more complex, contradictory and in fact much more fascinating character: a product of the Cold War as much as of the 1960s and a Director-General who would pragmatically go along with censorship of particular programmes in order to avoid the public 'embarrassment' of splits between programme-makers and the BBC Board of Governors as he tried to navigate the Corporation as smoothly as possible through the more liberal 1960s and compete more effectively with ITV for the mass television audience. 48 Above all, we need to be clear-eyed on the limits that there were and perhaps still are to the BBC's much-vaunted independence from Government. We need to recognise that throughout most of the early years of the Cold War, the BBC was still penetrated by the ethos and indeed numerous of the former personnel of Whitehall, with some of the most senior appointments within the 7. Chapman's article, which was partly a response to Murphy, contested the 'conspiracy' view by arguing the censorship of the film was largely a BBC internal decision, however this attracted its own controversy when Mike Wayne received a right of response in the same journal accusing Chapman of 'failing the public' through an 'essentially apologetic defence of a public broadcaster's unhealthily close ties to the state' (Wayne, 2007: 627 Ministerial committee which was looking at the whole future of broadcasting in the UK.
Part of this involved considering whether the BBC should take advertising on its radio service, the Light Programme, as a means of financing the future expansion of broadcasting in lieu of any licence fee increase -a move Bowden (along with then Postmaster-General Tony Benn) championed but the BBC were readying to oppose. This would be why Greene and Normanbrook were in regular touch with Bowden during this period; why Bowden felt at liberty to raise the matter of The War Game with them and also provides a possible contextual explanation for why Greene and Normanbrook may have been particularly keen to be as diplomatic and as accommodating as possible to Government on controversial matters during this nervous period for the BBC. For further on Labour Government discussions and proposals around alternative financing of the BBC (proposals which were eventually shelved), see Briggs (1995: 536-46) and Freedman (2003: 50-55 
